Austin-Searle speech act theory
Let's start with some central and familiar elements of the prevailing theory of speech acts, as initiated by Austin (1975) and developed by Searle (1969 Searle ( , 1979 . Perhaps the most basic element of the theory is the distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content. This is codified on page one of Searle's 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts' in the form of the 'F(p)' schema, with 'F' for force and 'p' for propositional content (Searle 1979, ch.1) . The idea is that every speech act can be factored into these two components, force and content, each of which can vary independently of the other. For example, an assertion that you will close the door and an order to you to close the door share the same propositional content (that you will close the door) but differ in illocutionary force. Conversely, an assertion that you will close the door and an assertion that you will open the door share the same illocutionary force (assertion) but differ in propositional content. With the illocutionary force/propositional content distinction in hand, the theory of speech acts is conceived of as the project of giving theoretical descriptions of the various kinds of illocutionary forces. As Searle puts it in the taxonomy paper, "the aim of this paper then is to classify the different types of F," (1979, 1) .
These classifications are made along three primary lines: illocutionary point, direction of fit, and expressed psychological state. Illocutionary point captures the speaker's primary purpose in performing the speech act. The illocutionary point of an assertion is to commit the speaker to something's being the case. 1 The illocutionary point of an order is to attempt to get the hearer to do something. The illocutionary point of a promise is to commit the speaker to some future course of action.
Direction of fit is an abstract way of capturing differences in the satisfaction conditions of different kinds of speech acts. Assertions are satisfied when they are true,
i.e. when they correctly describe the way things are. Assertions therefore have word-toworld direction of fit; an assertion has to match the world in order to be satisfied. Orders and promises, by contrast, require a change in the world, in the form of an action by the hearer or speaker, in order to be satisfied. Orders and promises have world-to-word direction of fit.
The third dimension of classification is expressed psychological state. In making assertions speakers express beliefs, in giving orders they express desires, and in making promises they express intentions. A speech act's expressed psychological state is closely related to its sincerity conditions. A speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker actually possesses the psychological state that she expresses in the performance of that act.
Using these three dimensions of classification, along with differences in propositional content, Searle classifies speech acts into five broad categories: Assertives, Directives, Commissives, Expressives, and Declarations. I will use Searle's notation in giving this taxonomy:
Examples: pronouncing two people man and wife, christening a ship, terminating someone's employment, adjourning a meeting, appointing someone chairman Declarations are speech acts in which the speaker brings about a new state of affairs by declaring that that state of affairs is the case. For example, if I am your boss and I say 'You're fired' then I make it the case that you are fired. Typically, declarations require a background institution or conventional practice, and the new states of affairs they bring into existence are within these institutions or practices. The illocutionary point of a declaration, D, is thus to bring about a new state of affairs by way of the successful performance of the declaration. According to Searle, declarations have both word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit (↕). They are statements to the effect that things are thus-and-so (word-to-world), and at the same time attempts to make the world thus-and-so (world-to-word). Declarations lack sincerity conditions and consequently have no associated expressed psychological states (Ø). Finally, the propositional contents of declarations concern the new states of affairs that are brought into existence by their performance, hence the variable '(p)'.
The only speech acts left out of this taxonomy are those lack propositional content, such as greetings ('Hello', 'So long') and exclamations ('Ouch', 'Damn'). Because they lack propositional contents these speech acts do not fit into the F(p) schema. Otherwise, the taxonomy is meant to be exhaustive.
I have been belaboring all of this in order to set it up as a target. In the remainder of this paper I am going to argue that this approach to speech acts is all wrong, and not just in the details but in its fundamentals. The basic problem for Searle's theory of speech acts is that it is wedded to a conception of propositional content that is explanatorily empty and unsustainable. This conception has had a distorting influence on the classification of speech acts -in particular, it has led Searle to find propositional content in places where there isn't any. Replacing this conception of content with one that is more viable leads to a different view of the nature of speech acts and a different taxonomy.
The Fregean picture of propositional content
Let's now step back in order to get a clearer sense of the conception or picture of propositional content operating in the background of Austin-Searle speech act theory.
This picture of content is largely due to Frege (in particular, Frege 1918a ), although
Russell is also a major influence. (Russell, however, propositions. It is a framework in which those debates are conducted.
There are three major elements of the Fregean picture of content. The first is that propositions are regarded as the original or primary bearers of truth conditions. Other things that have truth conditions, such as beliefs, assertions, and declarative sentences, derive their truth conditions from propositions. An assertion that the door is closed, for example, is true iff the door is closed because this assertion has as its content the proposition that the door is closed, and this proposition is true iff the door is closed. The possession of these truth conditions by the proposition is primary; the assertion inherits its truth conditions from its propositional content. The same goes for non-truthconditional speech acts. Orders and promises also derive their satisfaction conditions from their propositional contents, although in these cases the truth conditions of a proposition have to be converted into fulfillment conditions. If I order you to close the door my order is fulfilled iff you close the door. The order has these fulfillment conditions because its content is the proposition that you will close the door, and in giving the order I put this proposition forward with the force of an order. When that happens, the truth conditions of the proposition are converted into fulfillment conditions.
The claim that propositions are the original or primary bearers of truth conditions is thus explanatory in nature. It signals an explanatory order in which propositions are primary and speech acts are secondary. The nature of the explanation here is constitutive.
Facts about the satisfaction conditions of speech acts are grounded in or (partly)
constituted by facts about the truth conditions of propositions. To accept this element of the Fregean picture is to regard propositions as a source of truth conditions. That is their role in the theory -to serve as a repository of truth conditions, which we put to use in thought and speech. To explain why our thoughts and utterances have the satisfaction conditions that they have we must always look to the propositions that are deployed in their performance. This theory helps us understand how our thoughts and speech acts have satisfaction conditions only to the extent that we can understand how propositions have truth conditions.
The second major element of the Fregean picture is the distinction between content and force, crisply captured in Searle's F(p) schema. In fact, the F(p) schema combines two different ways of understanding the content-force distinction. The first, which I call the taxonomic version of the distinction, is the idea that there is a single kind of propositional content, which is truth conditional, and which is shared across all varieties of speech acts. On this form of the content-force distinction it is possible for an assertion and an order, for example, to share the same proposition as content. The contrasting view would be one on which the contents of assertions are different in kind from the contents of orders, where these differences consist at least in part in differences in satisfaction conditions. On this view, an assertion that you will close the door and order to you to close the door would not share the same truth-conditional proposition as content. Rather, the order would have a distinct type of entity as content, where this entity has fulfillment conditions instead of truth-conditions. It is now standard in semantics to distinguish the contents of interrogative sentences, questions, from the contents of declaratives, and a similar view about imperative sentences is gaining currency. 4 Abandoning the taxonomic form of the content-force distinction involves making the same sorts of distinctions for speech-acts.
The second form of the content-force distinction, the constitutive form, is the idea that propositional contents are entirely devoid of any elements force. In particular, there are no assertoric elements in propositions. One way to put this is to say that in characterizing the nature of propositional contents we do not need to use any concepts of force, assertive or otherwise. Concepts of force characterize the actions that we perform with propositions. Propositions have their natures prior to and independently of these actions. This version of the content-force distinction goes to the heart of the conception of speech acts given to us by Austin-Searle speech act theory. To put it crudely, on this conception a speech act is something you do with a proposition.
The third major element of the Fregean picture is the view that any thought or speech act with propositional content can be factored into neutral and non-neutral components. In the case of mental acts or states, the neural components are acts or states of entertaining a proposition. To perform a judgment, for example, is to entertain a proposition (neutral) while endorsing or accepting that proposition (non-neutral). To form a desire is to entertain a proposition (neutral) while wanting that proposition to be true (non-neutral). In general, to adopt a propositional attitude requires singling out or entertaining a proposition and taking a non-neutral attitude toward that proposition. These need not be conceived of as separate and freestanding mental acts, but rather as abstractions from the overall act of forming a judgment or desire, which we can distinguish as theorists. In the case of speech acts, the factoring idea is prefigured in a dark way by Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, which gets replaced and clarified in the form of Searle's distinction between propositional acts and illocutionary acts. 5 The thought is that every speech act can be factored into an act of expressing a proposition (neutral), while putting that proposition forward with a certain illocutionary force (non-neutral). As in the mental case, we do not have to view these as separate, individual acts but rather as theoretically distinguishable components of the overall act.
These three elements of the Fregean picture are all closely related, and it may be artificial to separate them out as distinct ideas. In fact, it is natural to see the second and another to explain how it has truth conditions. This is why it makes sense to call this a "unity" problem. The hope is that by understanding how the components of a proposition are bound together into a unified whole we will understand how the proposition represents the world as being a certain way and is truth-evaluable. The problem remains even if we give up the assumption that propositions are structured things with parts or constituents, although in that case the label "unity problem" looks inappropriate. It is still possible to ask how a simple, structureless entity is capable of representing things as being a certain way and having certain truth conditions. Both Frege and Russell saw the problem clearly. Although they differed over the nature of the constituents, both held that propositions have constituents and structure and both felt the need to say something about how these constituents are unified together.
Frege's solution bottoms out in a relation of saturation whereby a saturated sense completes an unsaturated one (Frege 1918c, 390) . This solves the problem only by positing an unexplained relation that has the power to generate contents with truth conditions. This is like introducing a primitive "propositional" relation, which has the ability to combine propositional constituents into unified, representational wholes. This is not a satisfying way of solving the unity problem. The question we are trying to answer is about how propositions are capable of representing the world and having truth conditions. It is altogether facile and unilluminating to be told that there is a primitive relation that does all the work. 6 Russell's solution is even worse. His 1903 theory assimilates propositions to states of affairs or facts in which objects are joined together by relations-that-relate (Russell 1903) . This has the notorious consequence that there are no false propositions. case it is a mistake to think that we need to give an account of how this is so. This is a tempting thought. Accepting it, however, generates pressure to take on additional metaphysical commitments about the nature of propositions. In particular, it leads to the view that propositions are simple, unstructured entities that are the primitive and primary bearers of truth conditions. Presumably, if a proposition were composite, then we could use its constituents and their relations to one another to explain why it has its truth conditions. But on the present proposal there is no such explanation to be had.
Furthermore, as Trenton Merricks has recently pointed out (Merricks 2015, 201-4) , if
propositions have constituents and are also primitive bearers of truth conditions then there would be an unexplained correlation between the constituents of a proposition and its truth conditions. Suppose the proposition that Russell is a philosopher has Russell and the property of being a philosopher as constituents. In addition, this proposition is true iff
Russell is a philosopher, and primitively so. There is then a correlation between the constituents of the proposition, Russell and the property of being a philosopher, and the truth conditions of the proposition, Russell's possessing this property. But this correlation is coincidental and mysterious, since facts about the constituents of a proposition and its truth conditions are explanatorily independent. The fact that a proposition has its constituents cannot explain why it has its truth conditions, since by hypothesis there is no explanation for the latter. Conversely, the fact that a proposition has its truth conditions cannot explain why it has certain constituents, at least not in any robust sense of constituency. A robust sense of constituency would be one on which constituency is identified with something like set-membership or mereological part-hood -a relation on which the proposition is literally composed out of and contains its constituents. 8 If that is how propositional constituency works then the explanation for why a proposition has its constituents wouldn't need to appeal to anything about the truth conditions of the proposition. All the explanatory work would be done by the compositional machinery that goes into constructing the proposition. Alternatively, we could take constituency in a non-robust sense, in which case to be a constituent of a proposition is nothing more than to figure in the right way in the truth conditions of the proposition (see McGlone 2012) . That would use facts about the truth conditions of a proposition to explain why it has its constituents, but the proposition still wouldn't be composed out of these constituents in any literal sense. Once again, the most natural view to take here would be that propositions are simple and unstructured.
The lesson is that if we decline to answer the question about how propositions have truth conditions then there is considerable pressure to regard propositions as noncomposite and metaphysically primitive. But one cannot stop there. If propositions lack constituents then entertaining a proposition cannot be understood as some kind of mental operation performed on its constituents. What would it be to entertain a simple, structure-less proposition? It looks as though we will also have to regard this as primitive.
The same goes for the act of judging a proposition. Again, judgment cannot be construed as an operation performed on the constituents of a proposition, since propositions lack constituents. Nor can judgment be analyzed as an act of taking a proposition to be true, since to take a proposition to be true is just to judge it to be true. This would analyze judging that p in terms of judging that p is true, which sets off a vicious regress: to judge that p is to judge that p is true, which is judging that <that p is true> is true, which is judging that <<that p is true> is true> is true, and so on. So the act of judging a proposition will also have to be regarded as primitive. 9 Rejecting the need to explain 9 What about a functionalist analysis of entertainment and judgment, on which to entertain or judge that p is to be in possession of a mental state with a certain functional role? This is not an option for someone who accepts the Fregean picture of propositional content, with its commitment to the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth conditions. Part of what it means to say that propositions are the primary bearers of truth conditions is that beliefs and other propositional attitudes derive their representational features and truth conditions from propositions -truth conditions are transmitted from propositions to beliefs through the relations that believers bear to propositions. If that's right then any constitutive account of what it is to believe that p will have to make reference to a proposition, since without mentioning the proposition we won't be able to explain how a belief has the representational features and truth conditions that it has. On a functionalist account, however, we explain what it is to believe that p in terms of a mental state that bears causal connections to various sensory stimuli, other mental states, behavior, and so on. There's no mention here of the proposition that p. The picture how propositions have truth conditions leads to a creeping primitivism in which more and more has to be taken as brute and unexplainable. Here is where we end up: there are simple, metaphysically primitive entities that are the primary and primitive bearers of truth conditions. We latch onto these entities via a primitive relation of entertainment, and then judge them via a primitive act of judgment. The resulting judgments take on the truth conditions of the propositions that are entertained and judged. As a philosophical account of how we represent the world in thought this whole story seems empty, unsatisfying, and faintly bizarre.
Stepping back a bit, there is something dissatisfying about the very idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth conditions. As we saw earlier, to view propositions in this way is to regard them as a source of representation and truth conditions for our thoughts and utterances. This goes counter to the intuitive thought that we are the source of representation, not some abstract entities in another dimension.
Representation and truth conditions originate with us, in our acts of thinking and speaking about the world. We are producers of representations, not consumers of them.
But making good on this intuitive thought leads to a very different view about propositions and a very different conception of the nature of speech acts.
The classificatory picture of propositional content
Instead of treating propositions as a source of truth conditions let's view them as classificatory entities, which we use for identifying, individuating, and classifying our offered by functionalism is not one on which a belief derives its truth conditions from a proposition, but rather one on which the representational features and truth conditions of a belief can be accounted for directly in terms of its functional role. See (Hanks forthcoming b). (The tokens of (3) are in fact more diverse than this and include, among other things, promises by Russell to be a philosopher. More on this below.)
This approach to propositional content and its attendant conception of speech acts abandons all three features of the Fregean picture. Propositions are not the primary bearers of truth conditions, nor do they serve as a source of truth conditions. Their role in the theory is classificatory; they are types that we use for making distinctions between speech acts. Furthermore, this approach gives up the content-force distinction, in both its taxonomic and constitutive forms. There is no single kind of propositional content running through all the varieties of speech acts. Rather, there are three kinds of contents, each with its own style of satisfaction conditions, which are the contents of speech acts with these respective satisfaction conditions. Furthermore, each kind of content has an element of force built into it, in the form of ┣, ?, or !. In characterizing these different types we have to mention these three kinds of combinatory acts, and the concepts of these combinatory acts are concepts of force. This leads to an entirely different understanding of the concept of force than the one given to us by Austin-Searle speech act theory. On that theory, the concept of an illocutionary force is the concept of something you do with a proposition. On the present classificatory alternative, at least in simple atomic cases, concepts of force are concepts of things you do with an object and property. Finally, this approach abandons the notions of entertainment and propositional acts. There is no factoring of mental states and speech acts into neutral and non-neutral components. To perform a judgment or assertion, on this view, is to predicate a property of an object. We cannot isolate within these acts any neutral core of entertaining or expressing a proposition.
Unlike the Fregean picture of content, which provides a single, all-purpose kind of proposition, the classificatory conception makes a three-way distinction between predicative, interrogative, and imperative propositions. This three-way distinction lines up with the three-way distinction in language between declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences. This three-way distinction in sentences is, as it turns out, a linguistic universal (König and Siemund 2007) .
11
The three-way distinction in contents also lines up with a three-way distinction between embedded clauses. English has that-clauses, e.g. 'Frege said that Russell is a philosopher', whether and wh-clauses, e.g. 'Frege asked whether Russell is a philosopher', and non-finite clauses, e.g. 'Frege told Russell to be a philosopher'. In English, non-finite clauses are used to report not just orders and commands, but entreaties, promises, desires and intentions:
11 That is, every language has at least these three kinds of sentences, declarative, interrogative, and imperative. Many languages, such as English, have more, e.g. the optative mood, as in 'Would that Russell were a philosopher'. On the classificatory approach the contents of optatives are grouped together with imperatives, since they have fulfillment conditions and world-to-word direction of fit.
Frege told/ordered/commanded Russell to be a philosopher.
Frege begged Russell to be a philosopher.
Frege wants Russell to be a philosopher.
Russell promised to be a philosopher.
Russell intends to be a philosopher.
All of the speech acts and mental states listed here have fulfillment conditions with world-to-word or world-to-mind direction of fit. This is a unified category of acts and .) The type of act of ordering, symbolized by '!', has to be understood at a high enough level of generality to cover not just orders and commands, but all the other acts and states on this list. To order an object to have a property is thus to perform an act that can be fulfilled or unfulfilled and which has world-to-word/mind direction of fit.
'Ordering' is, I admit, a misnomer for this kind of act.
In fact all three kinds of combinatorial acts, predication, asking, and ordering, should be understood at this high level of generality. The difference between these types is a difference in sub-types of !, one corresponding to acts of requesting and another to acts of commanding. I see no reason not to call these more finely grained types propositions. Insofar as the request and order fall under the coarsely grained type ! <Russell, PHILOSOPHER> they share a propositional content.
Insofar as they fall under the distinct sub-types (4a) and (4b) they have different propositional contents. Remember that on this approach propositions play a classificatory role. Their job is to help us identify and individuate our mental states and speech acts. The identification of propositions with types allows us to make 12 In a mention-all question, e.g. 'Who is coming to dinner?', a speaker is looking for a complete list of all the things that satisfy a certain predicate. By contrast, in a mentionsome question, e.g. 'Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?', a speaker is only looking for some of the things that satisfy the predicate. See (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997, 1111) . The distinction between open and confirmation questions is due to (Fiengo 2007) .
In an open question a speaker is genuinely ignorant about the answer to the question and is seeking new information. In a confirmation question, e.g. I see you enter the room soaking wet and ask 'Is it raining?', the speaker is seeking confirmation for something she already believes (Fiengo 2007, 11) .
classificatory distinctions at many levels of fineness of grain. This captures another difference between the classificatory picture and the Fregean picture. On the latter, for any pair of speech acts there will be a single, univocal verdict about whether they share a propositional content. On the classificatory picture, the issue of whether two speech acts have the same propositional content will be informed by our classificatory interests and purposes. In some cases it will be useful or productive to classify a request and a command under the same propositional content and in others not.
Like the three-way distinction between satisfaction conditions (truth, answerhood, and fulfillment) there is also a three-way distinction between directions of fit, although saying this requires bringing to light a heretofore unrecognized third direction of fit. In the last part of this paper I am going to use this approach to content to give a new taxonomy of speech acts. First, however, I need to remove the main obstacle in its way.
Cancellation
Accepting the classificatory conception of propositional content as I've articulated it here requires giving up the content-force distinction in both of its forms.
14 In particular, it requires giving up the constitutive form of this distinction. On the classificatory account, propositions are constitutively characterized by elements of force.
The proposition that Russell is a philosopher is a type of act of predicating the property of being a philosopher of Russell, where the kind of predication involved is inherently assertoric in nature.
This runs headlong into Frege's forceful argument for keeping assertion out of propositional content (see Frege 1918b and Geach 1965 ). Frege's argument is based on the fact that in many practical and linguistic contexts it is possible to use a sentence, without any change in meaning or content, without asserting the content of that sentence.
This occurs when actors use sentences on stage, or when poets write lines in poetry, or when someone utters a sentence inside a conditional or disjunction. In all of these cases speakers uses sentences with their normal meanings without in any way committing themselves to the propositional contents of those sentences. How could that be possible if these contents were inherently assertoric? Frege concluded that propositions must be devoid of any judgmental or assertoric components. This line of thought is central to the constitutive version of the content-force distinction and to the wider Fregean picture of propositional content in which it is embedded.
Here is a different way of thinking about it. Let's focus on the actor. When a person utters a declarative sentence as part of a play she is in a special sort of context in which performing an act of predication does not have its usual requirements or consequences. The actor says 'Russell is a philosopher' and predicates being a philosopher of Russell, but the actor need not believe this, nor is she committed to its truth. In other words, the actor performs an act of predication in a context in which that act does not have the status of an assertion. Call this sort of context a cancellation context, and an act of predication performed within it an act of cancelled predication.
The reason that the actor's utterances are not assertions, then, is that they take place in a cancellation context. Similarly, when you utter a sentence inside a conditional, your use of 'if' creates a cancellation context for the acts of predication you perform with the antecedent and consequent. 15 So you do perform acts of predication with these embedded sentences, but these acts of predication are cancelled. 16 That's why your utterances of the antecedent and consequent are not assertions. It's not that there is less going on when you utter a sentence inside a conditional, e.g. the expression of a proposition without assertion. Rather, there is more going on. You have performed an act of predication in a special sort of context generated by your use of 'if', and in that kind of context acts of predication do not count as assertions.
There are reasons for thinking that cancellation does a better job of accounting for these cases than the Fregean approach. On Frege's view, the reason the actor's utterances are not assertions is that they lack assertoric force -the actor is not putting propositions forward as true:
When playing his part the actor is not asserting anything; nor is he lying, even if he says something of whose falsehood he is convinced. In poetry we have the case of thoughts being expressed without being actually put forward as true, in spite of the assertoric form of the sentence. (Frege 1918a, 330) 15 I think this is part of the meaning of the word 'if' (or, at least, some kinds of English conditionals). This is an instance of a general semantic distinction between sentenceembedding expressions. Sentence-embedding expressions come in two varieties: those that create cancellation contexts and those that do not. Examples of the former include 'or', 'not', and 'possibly', examples of the latter include 'and', 'true', and 'necessarily'. See (Hanks 2015, ch.4 ; forthcoming a) for discussion. 16 In a discussion of cancellation and disjunction I once wrote that in an utterance of 'George is clever or Karla is foolish' "a speaker neither predicates cleverness of George nor foolishness of Karla," (Hanks 2011, 21) . That was a mistake. I did not understand my own concept of cancellation when I wrote that paper. The speaker does perform these acts of predication -it's just that these acts do not count as assertions. Green (this volume) argues that my account of cancellation in (Hanks 2011 ) is inconsistent, and he is right to do so.
If this were right then the actor's utterances would count as assertions if the actor were to supply the missing assertoric element. So, suppose the actor intends to put her utterances forward as true. Give her whatever intentions or beliefs or mental states you like. The problem is that nothing will suffice for turning her utterances into assertions. As long as she is acting her role in the play nothing she says counts as her own assertion. The only way for the actor to make assertions for herself is to leave the play -to get herself out of the fictional context of the play. This provides a strong indication that it is the special context of the play, and not any missing intentions or actions on the part of the actor, which explains why the actor's utterances are not assertions. The cancellation context generated by the play makes it impossible for her to perform assertions for herself.
Something similar can be said about 'if', although here the situation is more complex because of the enormous complications surrounding conditionals in English.
I find the following analogy to be helpful in thinking about cancellation contexts and cancelled predication. In football (the American kind) when the defense commits a penalty the referees allow the play to continue, which typically results in a free play for the offense. Suppose this happens, e.g. a defensive player commits a holding penalty.
Suppose also that after the penalty a defensive player does something good for the defense, e.g. tackles the opposing quarterback in the endzone. Normally this would count as a safety and the defense would get two points. However, because of the penalty, the play is called back and run over again. The defense has not scored a safety and does not get two points. Notice, though, that in this scenario the defense did exactly the same sort of thing they would normally do to score a safety. A defensive player actually tackled the quarterback in the endzone. But because of the penalty the act of tackling the quarterback does not count as a safety. This act of tackling the quarterback does not have the status of a safety within the game.
We have something similar in our language game. Predication is to tackling the quarterback as assertion is to scoring a safety. In an act of cancelled predication a
speaker does exactly what she normally does when she performs an act of predication.
Absent the cancellation context this act would count as an assertion with all of its usual requirements and commitments. But because the act of predication is performed on stage, or as part of a poem, or after the use of 'if', or inside a disjunction, this act of predication does not count as an assertion. 17 Acts of predication are inherently assertoric in the sense that to perform a stand-alone act of predication in a normal context is to perform an assertion. The fact that there are embedded acts of predication that are not assertions, or acts of predication in special environments that are not acts of predication, just shows that the assertoric character of predication can be overridden by the use of certain words or in special contexts.
Frege's argument for the constitutive form of the content-force distinction is therefore not compelling. 18 The concept of cancellation provides us with a better way of understanding why we do not assert the antecedents or consequents of conditionals,
17 If the acts of predication found in antecedents and consequents and disjuncts are cancelled and non-assertoric then what accounts for their unity, and how do we still have truth-evaluable inputs for conditionals and disjunctions? (Jespersen 2012) , (Reiland 2013) , and (Hom and Schwartz 2013) all press these questions. I don't have the space to answer them here, but see the account of target-shifting in (Hanks 2015 ch.4) and (Hanks forthcoming a).
18 That said, I don't think there is anything incoherent about Frege's content-force distinction. Green (this volume) takes an argument I have given for the incoherence of Soames's concept of predication to be a general argument for the incoherence of the content-force distinction. I never intended to give such a general argument. See (Soames 2010; King et. al. 2014 ) for Soames's account of predication, and (Hanks 2015, ch.1) for the argument against it that Green criticizes.
which is consistent with acknowledging an assertoric element in the contents of declarative sentences. This removes, I think, the main barrier in the way of the classificatory conception of content.
A new taxonomy
The first major distinction in the taxonomy is between speech acts that have propositional content and those that don't. On the non-propositional side we have acts like greetings ('Hello') and exclamations ('Ouch'). Searle's taxonomy, by contrast, treats directives and commissives as two independent taxonomic categories, despite the fact that they have the same direction of fit. Searle was unhappy with this aspect of his taxonomy. As he put it, he could not avoid the "inelegant solution of two separate categories with the same direction of fit," (Searle 1979, 15 e. The board appointed her chairman.
There are no embedded content clauses in these sentences, which is a strong indication that the actions they report lack propositional contents. The verbs in these sentences express simple relations between people and other people, or people and things like ships or meetings. To pronounce two people man and wife is not to do something with a proposition. It is to do something to the bride and groom (or to the social institution of marriage of which they are now participants).
Perhaps an even more telling fact about declarations is that they lack satisfaction conditions. Declarations are not true or false, nor are they fulfilled or unfulfilled. It makes no sense to say that an act of pronouncing two people man and wife is true, or that it was fulfilled. It is crucial here to distinguish between satisfaction conditions and success conditions. An act of marrying two people can, of course, be successful or This draws out another mistake in Searle's taxonomy. According to Searle, declarations have both word-to-world and world-to-word direction of fit. If that were so then we should expect declarations to be both true or false and fulfilled or unfulfilled. But neither of these distinctions applies to declarations. Declarations have no direction of fit because they lack satisfaction conditions altogether.
One might try to resist this by pointing to examples of declarations that clearly can be evaluated for truth and falsity, e.g. when an umpire in a baseball game says 'You're out', or a judge says to the defendant 'You are guilty'. These are examples of what Searle calls "assertive declarations," cases in which an authority figure performs a declaration by asserting that something is the case (Searle 1979, 19-20) . 19 Given that the authority figure can get the facts wrong (the runner beat the throw, the defendant didn't do it), it seems like these kinds of declarations can be assessed for truth and falsity. But this doesn't threaten my claim that declarations lack satisfaction conditions. The categories of assertives and declarations are just types of speech acts, and any particular token speech act can fall under multiple types. When the umpire says 'You're out', he does two things at once: he asserts that you are out, and he makes a declaration to the effect that you are out. Only the former has truth conditions. Note the different ways of reporting the umpire's utterance:
6a. The umpire said/asserted/stated that the runner was out.
b. The umpire called the runner out.
(6a) has an embedded clause, (6b) does not. This reflects the fact that (6a) reports the umpire's utterance as an assertion with propositional content and truth conditions, whereas (6b) reports it as a declaration with neither. 20 The umpire's utterance qua assertion was true or false, but qua declaration it was neither. In terms of our new taxonomy, then, declarations belong on the non-propositional side along with greetings, exclamations, and other speech acts that lack satisfaction conditions. The same goes for expressives, although here the case is a bit harder to make.
The sentences we use to report expressives do contain embedded sentences, in the form of gerundive clauses:
19 See also Bach and Harnish's distinction between effectives and verdictives (Bach and Harnish 1979, ch.6) . 20 Of course (6a) can also be used (indirectly, I would say) as a report of a declaration. The point is that (6a), unlike (6b), attributes propositional content and truth conditions to the umpire's speech act.
7a. He thanked her for opening the door.
b. She apologized for stepping on his toe.
c. He congratulated her for finishing her dissertation.
Like infinitive clauses, gerundive clauses, e.g. 'for opening the door' and 'for stepping on his toe', are thought to contain a null pronoun, PRO, in subject position (Haegeman 1994, 275-6) . So, for example, the form of (6a) No one thinks that acts of hugging, punishing, or paying have propositional contents.
The gerundive clauses in (8a-c) are not being used to express the propositional contents of the acts they report. They are being used to give reasons or explanations for why these acts were performed. The reason he hugged her is that she opened the door. The same goes for the gerundive clauses in (7a-c). The gerundive clause in (7a) does not give the content of his act of thanking; it gives a reason for that act of thanking. It is a mistake, then, to think that the embedded clauses in reports of expressive speech acts give the propositional contents of those speech acts.
Another giveaway that expressives lack propositional contents can be found in Searle's own description of them. According to Searle, expressives have no direction of fit. This means that they lack satisfaction conditions. Like all speech acts, an expressive speech act can be successful or unsuccessful (which in this case is largely a matter of being sincere or insincere). But they are not true or false or fulfilled or unfulfilled.
Given this fact about expressives, it would be surprising to find that they had propositional contents. The role for propositional content in Austin-Searle speech act theory is to determine satisfaction conditions. Attributing propositional content to a speech act that lacks satisfaction conditions looks entirely otiose.
Here, then, is the completed taxonomy, with declarations and expressives filled in 
